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GLOBALIZATION AND THE TRANSITION
IN EASTERN EUROPE
Peter Rutland1
I. Introduction
Everyone agrees that globalization is an increasingly prominent
feature of life in the late twentieth century. Globalization is
taken to mean the spread of economic, political, and cultural
processes which transcend national boundaries and which tend
to produce convergence toward a homogeneous global culture.
The collapse of the socialist order in Eastern Europe and the sub-
sequent efforts to create “market democracy” in the former
socialist countries are seen as yet more evidence of the onward
march of globalization.
But what, concretely, does globalization mean? What exactly
are its political and economic ramifications? Is it good or bad for
human society, or somewhere in between? How are the costs
and benefits of globalization distributed between different coun-
tries and between different groups in society? To what extent
can human agents alter the process?
To answer these questions, it may be useful to begin with a
taxonomy of features of globalization. Too often, proponents of
globalization commit the sin of synecdoche — of taking the part
for the whole. “McDonald’s” or “Hollywood” is taken as stand-
ing for the entire process of globalization. The real situation is
more complex — and more ambivalent — than these debates
often suggest. “Globalization” connotes a complex range of eco-
nomic, political, and cultural processes that may or may not be
connected into some sort of unified paradigm. A central pur-
pose of this paper is to sort out precisely what we mean when
we talk about globalization by attempting to develop a taxon-
omy of its features.
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A second general problem with the globalization thesis is the
failure to pay sufficient attention to historical periodization.
Modernity and postmodernity are inextricably intertwined, but
it is not clear whether the globalization of the postmodern era is
really more profound and destabilizing than was the globaliza-
tion that took place during the last century. Some processes of
globalization, such as the spread of international trade, date
back to the sixteenth century and, arguably, peaked during the
nineteenth century. During the last century, urbanization and
industrialization transformed daily life, communications tech-
nology (i.e., trains, steamships) took a giant leap forward, and
Western technology and products broke into one society after
another around the world.
Is the current phase of globalization really as significant as
that which occurred one hundred years ago — or is it a mere
aftershock of the earlier cataclysm? For example, rather than
representing a new and higher stage of globalization, the cur-
rent absorption of Eastern Europe and Russia into global society
could be seen merely as the completion of the late-nineteenth-
century spread of industrial capitalism that had been so rudely
interrupted by the October 1917 Revolution. The Western
Weltanschauung still seems dominated by the belief that our soci-
ety is uniquely modern. (This in itself proves that we are still
trapped in the age of modernity.) We find it hard to conceive of
the nineteenth century as essentially “modern,” given that it
was an age when people still told time with pocket watches and
traveled by horse-drawn carriage. And yet, many of the core
features of globalization were, in fact, present one hundred
years ago and were accurately described in the works of Karl
Marx and other observers of the new industrial age. (Marx’s pre-
dictions and prescriptions were, of course, less persuasive than
his descriptions.)
II. Toward a Taxonomy of Globalization
A. Economic Features of Globalization2
What does it mean, in economic terms, to say that a country is
being increasingly exposed to the global economy? Globaliza-
Macalester International Vol. 2
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tion is usually associated with some or all of the following eco-
nomic developments:
• The spread of market institutions and policies: the privatiza-
tion of state-owned industries, efforts to shrink government
spending, reduction of government regulations, and the rise
of banks, stock markets, insider trading, etc.
• A rise in the proportion of Gross Domestic Product that is
traded internationally.
• Increased dependency on foreign markets, including such
negative features as unfair terms of trade and exposure to
severe fluctuations (e.g., in commodity prices).
• An increase in long-term direct foreign investment (DFI).
• Increased activity of transnational corporations (TNCs) sell-
ing their products and operating joint ventures.
• An increase in short-term capital flows, either portfolio
investment or speculative transfers gambling on exchange
rate changes. This phenomenon exploded in the 1980s with
the erosion of capital controls and the spread of electronic
banking.
• Growing international indebtedness, leading to the chronic
burden of heavy interest payments and the periodic eruption
of debt crises.
• An increased role of international financial institutions, such
as the IMF and World Bank, setting rules for trade regimes
and imposing conditions to release new loans.
• A shift in economic activity from goods to services, and from
large goods (e.g., railways, automobiles) to small, easily trans-
portable goods (e.g., VCRs, computers, movies, software).
• An association with growing inequality, both between
nations and within nations.
Globalization is usually seen as driven by economic factors (a
legacy of the Marxian schema of base and superstructure). How-
ever, it is also accompanied by profound political and cultural
changes, including those detailed below.
Peter Rutland
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B. Political Features of Globalization3
• The erosion of national sovereignty formerly enjoyed (sup-
posedly) by the independent nation-state.
• Inability to select an independent macroeconomic policy to
suit the conditions of a given economy.
• Widespread adoption of democracy and respect for human
rights (the most extreme expression of which being Francis
Fukuyama’s End of History thesis).4
• The collapse of legitimacy of political systems that offer an
alternative to democracy (e.g., fascism and communism).
Holdouts against this trend include Islamic theocracy as seen
in Iran and Algeria, and East Asian paternalism such as that
of Singapore.5
• The rise of regional blocs (military, economic, and political),
the European Union and NAFTA being paradigmatic cases.
• The rise of multinational institutions such as the UN and
OSCE (Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe)
to try to fill the gap caused by the hemorrhage of national
sovereignty.6
• The rise of transnational institutions (i.e., nongovernmental
organizations) that occupy the interstices within the multina-
tional governmental agencies.
C. Cultural Features of Globalization7
• Homogenization of lifestyle and values.
• Convergence on a U.S.-style pattern of mass consumption
(e.g., McDonald’s) and the social values that go along with it
—materialism, individualism, instant gratification, etc.
• The spread of mass, long-distance tourism.
• A renewed surge of migration from the Third to the First
World, creating ethnic enclaves in almost every advanced
Western society.8
• A reverse flow of influence from periphery to core countries
— stronger than that which also occurred during the initial
phase of imperial expansion. This manifests itself in the rise of
“multiculturalism” and uncertainty about the cultural distinc-
tiveness of individual nations.
Macalester International Vol. 2
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• The commercialization of cultural difference (ethnic clothing,
artifacts, restaurants, and even lifestyles and religions).
• Further deterioration in the social role of women as new
demands are placed upon them while new opportunities
open up for men.
• The renewed spread of new transnational religious cults,
most notably U.S.-born Pentecostalism, which is set to over-
take Catholicism as the world’s largest Christian church by
the year 2010.9
• A growing concern for personal health and the environment,
both of which are heavily commercialized but also tied to the
spread of social organizations such as Alcoholics Anonymous
and Herbalife.
• The arrival of new forms of communication that undermine
the former nation-based political and commercial controls
over the media. The radio, photocopier, and LP were fol-
lowed by the audiocassette tape, mass air travel, VCR, fax,
satellite television, and now the Internet.
• More often than not, the values disseminated through these
media are those of Hollywood. In European cities, most cine-
mas are showing American movies, and their television sta-
tions are steadily filling up with American soap operas. In the
Third World, many villages acquire battery-powered televi-
sions even before they receive electricity and running water.
III. Reflections on the Globalization Thesis
This section explores several of the ambiguities and contradic-
tions of the globalization thesis in the East European context.
A. Is Democracy Possible in a World without Nations?
These globalization processes are deeply contradictory. The
paradoxes of globalization are most clearly seen with regard to
two central political institutions: the nation-state and democ-
racy. Globalization is believed to involve both the rise of democ-
racy and the demise of the nation-state. And yet, how can
democracy express itself if not through the representative insti-
Peter Rutland
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tutions (e.g., parliaments, presidents) of the nation-state? In real-
ity, there is no democracy in the global village any more than
there was in the feudal village.
Globalization needed — and to an extent, still needs — the
nation-state. The nation-state flowered in the nineteenth century
as the ideal vehicle for the spread of industrial capitalism. Uni-
versal education, conscription, and suffrage emerged almost
simultaneously and were fused together by the phenomenon of
nationalism.10 The nation-state emerged as the basic building
block of the modern world political system at precisely the same
time that economic globalization was drawing in more and
more of the world’s population. The nation-state seemed to be
better equipped than rival political forms such as the city-state
and the multinational empire to provide the political and eco-
nomic functions that global marketization required. Michael
Mann has analyzed this role in terms of despotic functions (e.g.,
providing internal law and order, and waging successful wars
against other states) and infrastructural functions (e.g., provid-
ing the public goods necessary for a market to function: coinage,
transport, legal system, health care, etc.).11
However, in the late twentieth century, the nation-state has
become less able to carry out these functions effectively.12 Con-
sider the state’s despotic functions. More and more the state is
powerless to provide domestic security, which is increasingly
provided by private means, involving everything from physical
relocation to secure areas to the rise of private security services.
Meanwhile, war has become increasingly irrelevant to the domi-
nant powers. Two of the leading industrial states, Japan and
Germany, have not used military force for fifty years. Even the
U.S. is profoundly wary of involving itself in a large-scale mili-
tary conflict (the Vietnam syndrome), and in 1972 it discarded
the cornerstone of the modern nation-state: universal male con-
scription. Military force has, in a sense, been “privatized” into
the hands of a small macho-techno elite. Where would Rambo
be without his helicopter and laser-guided bombs? The same
place John Wayne would have been without his Colt or Win-
chester.
The prognosis for the nation-state is equally gloomy with
regard to its infrastructural functions. The features of economic
globalization enumerated above make it clear that the nation-
Macalester International Vol. 2
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state’s capacity to regulate macroeconomic processes, particu-
larly financial matters, has become extremely constrained.
However, while globalization has weakened the functional
capacity of the nation-state, it is also held to involve the spread
of democracy as the only legitimate form of political organiza-
tion. Over the past twenty years, the number of nations that are
classified as democracies (in the Freedom House survey, for
example) has risen from one-third to two-thirds of the world’s
countries.13 And yet, just when more and more people have won
the power to select their political leaders through the ballot box,
those leaders find themselves hostage to transnational economic
and cultural forces over which they have less and less control.
As the people stormed the gates of parliaments, real power qui-
etly stole out the back door. The triumphant crowds of 1989
found themselves in a situation akin to Dorothy in the Wizard of
Oz when she discovered that the ruler wielded nothing more
than a megaphone behind a curtain.
Thus, the newly elected leaders of the Eastern European
democracies found that their capacity to select economic, cul-
tural, and political policy was severely constrained. If true, this
erosion of substantive decision-making power in modern
democracies could help explain an important, distinctive feature
of the new democracies of Eastern Europe: the weakness and
fragility of their political parties. In Eastern Europe, ideological
debates over the correct economic policy seemed to be redun-
dant. The IMF indicated how to draw up a budget, and the
World Bank advised which economic sectors to invest in and
which to close down. There seemed to be little enthusiasm for
public debate over the sort of controversies over which Western
political elites have divided themselves in the postwar era —
state regulation vs. the free market, Keynesian interventionist
vs. monetarist abstinence. In the absence of significant differ-
ences over policies or values, why should citizens become com-
mitted to rival political parties? And yet, can a modern
democracy function without political parties that have some
mass membership, or at least mass allegiance, among the voting
public? How else are public interests to be aggregated, parlia-
mentary candidates selected, and so forth?
Peter Rutland
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B. Is There Convergence toward a Homogeneous Lifestyle?
One can only be astonished at the speed with which U.S. prod-
ucts have spread throughout Eastern Europe. Within five years,
the store shelves and kitchen closets of Eastern Europeans have
been transformed. (Some more than others, of course, since one
of the central features of marketization is social differentiation.)
However, this section will argue that the massive influx of West-
ern consumerism may not actually signify the convergence
toward a homogeneous lifestyle that some proponents of the
globalization thesis suggest.
After the 1989 revolutions, the first Western products to
arrive were items such as chewing gum, cigarettes, soda, candy
bars, movies, washing detergent, and toothpaste.14 Why did
these goods make up the first wave of the invading army of
Western consumerism? The fact that these goods were physi-
cally compact and durable meant that it was easy to load them
onto a truck and import them into Eastern Europe. These prod-
ucts conferred high status because they were Western imports.
They were of better quality than the domestically produced
equivalents and more attractively packaged. They were pro-
moted through aggressive marketing campaigns, something to
which Eastern European consumers had hitherto barely been
exposed. The Western connection was the key marketing tactic,
with products often carrying a Western name — chewing gum
called Hollywood; cigarettes called West (whose advertising slo-
gan was “Test the West”), picturing the omnipresent Marlboro
Man; and even Head and Shoulders sold under its American
name. (Try to imagine an American pouring something labeled
Hlava a Ramena on his head.) Although these Western imports
were more expensive, individual units of these goods were
affordable and within the budget of the typical family (despite
the fact that real incomes were falling and average wages in
Eastern Europe are in the range of 100 to 400 American dollars
per month15).
Within a few years, Western firms had found domestic sites to
manufacture these products within Eastern Europe in order to
cut costs. Typically, Western tobacco companies have been the
largest single investor in each former socialist country. Western
firms went on to set up more sophisticated distribution net-
Macalester International Vol. 2
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works and began to tailor their advertising to take into account
national cultural differences. At the same time, domestic pro-
ducers began to improve quality, packaging, and marketing; but
in most product areas, they had already irretrievably lost former
markets to their foreign competitors.
The visibility of the second wave of Western products then
started to increase. These are the more expensive products or
those requiring more infrastructural investment and more
entanglement with local legal systems. They are often targeted
on the small but growing group of wealthy consumers rather
than on the mass market. The second wave includes fast-food
restaurants, retail stores, consumer durables manufacturing
plants, and financial services.
This consumer onslaught has been accompanied by a grow-
ing social prominence attached to money. Old social-status hier-
archies — the political power of the communists, the cultural
stature of the intelligentsia, the moral authority of the dissidents
—have been supplanted by the brash street visibility of the nou-
veaux riches with their Mercedes Benzes and cellular phones. If
there is one single factor that encapsulates the process of global-
ization, it is the increased prominence of the role of money.
Money cuts across the economic, political, and cultural fea-
tures of globalization. It is obviously central to the economic
dimension. However, it is also dominant in the political arena.
Political leaders appeal to potential voters over pocketbook
issues. The Right promises future prosperity from marketiza-
tion, while the Left promises continuing subsidies to protect cur-
rent living standards. Given the dearth of real ideological
differences between the political parties, access to cash to fund
U.S.-style media campaigns is an important factor in electoral
success. (Observers of Russia monitor which private bank is
funding which political party with the same attention they used
to devote to who stands next to whom on top of Lenin’s mau-
soleum.)
Left-wing parties have generally been more successful than
right-wing parties at appealing to these pocketbook issues—one
of the apparent paradoxes of transition that should alert us to
the contradictions of modernization. The major exception to the
leftward trend in Eastern European elections since 1992 has
been Václav Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party in the Czech Repub-
Peter Rutland
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lic, which was able to launch a mass coupon privatization
scheme just one month before the June 1992 parliamentary elec-
tions.16 Under the scheme, 95 percent of the adult population col-
lected coupons with which they could bid for shares in
privatized firms. Investment funds sprang up, offering up to
$500 for each coupon booklet. As finance minister in the outgo-
ing Civic Forum coalition government, Klaus made sure that his
name appeared on every privatization coupon. The message
was clear: “Vote for me if you want the coupon privatization to
continue, so that you can make some money on your coupons.”
His party won the election and formed a governing center-right
coalition that has been the most stable in Eastern Europe. (They
also had the nerve to put onto the new 200-crown bill an image
from one of their campaign posters — that of a child’s hand
touching an adult’s.)
What of the cultural impact of the rise of money? It is
emblematic that one of the most popular new Czech television
shows is Televisni Bingo, a weekly ritual in which millions of
families buy a bingo card at $1 each, and check off numbers
simultaneously with a live studio audience and a cluster of well-
known personalities. The imagery is none too subtle, and makes
Jeopardy! look like an Oxford Union debate. The camera zooms
in on a bill-counting machine on the stage, which produces thick
wads of 100-crown ($4) bills, that are presented to winners in the
studio audience.
Thus, there is plenty of evidence for the casual observer to
conclude that Western consumerism is triumphantly rampaging
across Eastern Europe. However, appearances can be deceptive,
and the underlying reality is more complicated than these initial
impressions suggest.
First, note that the crass materialism of Televisni Bingo goes
beyond anything one sees in the West. It is, in fact, a uniquely
Czech event. The leading personalities who take part in the pro-
ceedings are Czech and would be totally unknown to a Western
audience. The same process of “customization” of Western val-
ues can even be seen in the case of the television soap operas
(from MASH to Chicago Hope) that are filling the screens of East-
ern Europe. These programs are dubbed into the native lan-
guages — a complex operation requiring emotional range in
one’s voice and skillful timing to coincide with the mouth move-
Macalester International Vol. 2
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ments of the original actor. Czech dubbing actors become well-
known personalities in their own right — the actor who dubs
Clint Eastwood, for example — and are featured on talk shows.
Second, one should bear in mind that materialist values did
not land in Eastern Europe only in 1989; they had deep roots in
the pre-1989 era. Sociological surveys of the mid-1980s show
that socialism had implanted materialistic and individualist val-
ues in much of the region’s youth. Their life goals were mar-
riage, family, and the acquisition of key possessions, e.g.,
television, house, car, and travel—not that dissimilar to those of
their colleagues in Western Europe. The difference was in their
ability to realize these goals. The socialist era has left a distinct
imprint in consumption patterns, which means that daily life in
the East is still quite different from that in the West (e.g., closer
ties within the extended family, low geographical mobility, dif-
ferent work habits, more prevalent ownership of country dachas,
etc.).
This leads to the third point: that the wider circulation of cer-
tain U.S. products does not mean that we are all on the slippery
slope to total cultural homogenization. Cultural differences still
matter even between one Western European country and
another, and even more so between Europe and America. (Con-
sider, for example, the contrast between U.S. and German store
hours on the weekends. Whereas most stores in the U.S. are
open for all or most of the weekend, German stores typically
close by 2:00 on Saturday afternoon and do not re-open until
Monday morning.) Nobody would deny the cultural distinctive-
ness of Japan, or suggest that some inexorable process of cul-
tural convergence between Japan and America is underway.
And yet, Japan has been a key player in economic globalization,
not only in the sheer volume of trade but also in technological-
cultural innovations such as the Sony Walkman (developed for
those long subway rides). Hong Kong gave us not just cheaply
assembled gadgets, but also the kung fu movie.
Thus, globalization is a two-way process, or, more exactly, a
multidirectional process. Viewed from Washington or New
York, globalization may appear to be the unidirectional dissemi-
nation of American culture. However, appearances can be
deceptive. For every McDonald’s opened in the Third World,
there has been a Chinese restaurant or a Taco Bell in the U.S.
Peter Rutland
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Britain brought railways and (eventually) democracy to India,
but with the subsequent flow of migrants from the subcontinent,
Britain has, in return, changed its diet and accelerated the secu-
larization of its schools in the last ten years. As Eastern Europe
expands its connections with the global economy, it will do so
on its own terms and will make its own contribution to the cul-
ture that emerges within its borders and beyond.
IV. Responses to the Challenge of Globalization
The general response of intellectuals to globalization has been to
see it as a threat and to move quickly to a discussion of strate-
gies to cope with the threat. As the reader will have gathered
from the preceding argument, the author believes that we need
to study more carefully what, precisely, globalization entails
before we jump to the conclusion that it is dangerous and/or
undesirable. However, it may be useful to summarize three gen-
eral responses to the perceived challenge of globalization. The
first two tend to dominate debates on the subject. The author is a
cautious advocate of the third strategy.
A. Autarky
Autarky has been a repeated response of rulers (less so of peo-
ples) to the challenge of globalization from the Chinese Middle
Kingdom onward. However, it is very difficult to seal off one’s
country from the globalization process. This century’s greatest
experiment in autarky — socialism — came crashing down
between 1989 and 1991, and the edifice is crumbling in China.
Only North Korea survives from that era, and in its waning
years, even Pyongyang will run on oil and nuclear power pro-
vided by Uncle Sam, courtesy of the U.S. nuclear nonprolifera-
tion policy.
Iran is the most recent example of a country that made a
determined effort to turn back the twentieth century. The 1979
revolution was clearly a revolution against the West. It is typical
of the global era, however, that the revolution itself was the
product of modern technology. Khomeini’s sermons, taped in
his Parisian exile, were smuggled back to Iran and spread
underground. Since 1979, Iran’s leaders have tried to turn back
Macalester International Vol. 2
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the Wheel of History, including condemnation of the influence
of the Great Satan, support for terrorism against the forces of
globalization, and seclusion of women from the public eye.
Young Komiteh zealots stage house raids in Teheran suburbs to
check the video collections of Teheran’s middle class. And yet,
the bazaars continue to import color televisions and VCRs. How
long can the ayatollahs sustain this struggle against modernity?
Autarky does not work for two reasons. First, it tries to stop
certain forces dead in their tracks, an approach reminiscent of
King Canute ordering back the tide.17 Second, it relies upon
some of the very instruments of modernity, such as the police
state and the oil industry in the case of Iran, to halt the spread of
globalization. This unleashes contradictory forces within society
and within the state apparatus itself. Rather than solving the
problem, it imports and intensifies the contradictions of global-
ization.
B. Self-Determination
Globalization has few political friends. Conservatives, of course,
see it as a challenge to traditional values and national identity.
However, with few exceptions, Western liberals are also critical
of globalization. (Libertarians, in contrast, almost universally
welcome its embrace.)
Despite their hostility to globalization, Western liberals retain
their belief in the power of progress; they believe that history is
still on their side and try to expose the silver lining of the dark
clouds of modernity. They preach an essentially universal creed
and welcome the spread of democracy and respect for human
rights. (However, liberal concern for the niceties of multicultur-
alism gives way when confronted by hard choices such as
whether to condone East African clitorectomy.) Liberals salute
the demise of the nation-state, arguing that it was the vehicle for
war and oppression. They are enthusiastic about the expansion
of international communication (Internet rather than Holly-
wood), and see the spread of transnational nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) as an opportunity for the creation of a
new, international civil society.18
However, liberal critics of globalization are naïve if they
imagine that they can benefit from the erosion of the nation-
Peter Rutland
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state. Democracy presupposes that one can identify the demos
(people) who are to exercise self-rule. The related concept of
human rights presupposes a framework of laws that define
these rights, a body of citizens who enjoy those rights, and a set
of (sovereign) institutions that can protect and implement them.
Democracy entails sovereignty over a given territory, and the
historically developed institution for the definition of territorial
sovereignty is the nation-state. If one does not take the existing
system of nation-states as a given, then one opens a Pandora’s
box for the redefinition of who constitutes the authentic people.
The most obvious criteria for defining the people are ethnicity
and religion; and events in Yugoslavia, Tajikistan, and Algeria
have shown that such disputes do not reach an easy consensus
and can quickly turn violent.
Without the nation-state, the communitarianism that liberals
advocate will be unchecked by the need to establish rules for
mutual coexistence. The communitarians offer a community of
citizens with rights, but without duties. The civil society that is
emerging in the era of globalization is the civil society of non-
state actors who, in many cases, refuse to accept the constraints
that nation-states traditionally imposed—from religious sects to
criminal mafias.
Western liberals also seem to have been wrong-footed by
internal political developments in Eastern Europe. In the 1980s,
they argued that a civil society of autonomous social move-
ments was growing up from below, as evidenced by the various
dissident movements and above all by Solidarity in Poland.
However, once the shell of communism cracked in 1989, the
institutions of the underground civil society were quickly mar-
ginalized and have generally played a very weak role in the
transition to capitalism and democracy. Key actors of the old
civil society movement (such as dissidents, the cultural intelli-
gentsia, and even industrial workers) have been severely weak-
ened — economically, politically, and psychologically — by the
onset of globalization and the spread of market forces. They
have not been very successful at finding a place for themselves
in postsocialist society.
Macalester International Vol. 2
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C. Customization
Globalization is universally experienced but does not produce
universal results. As any teacher knows, the same lectures and
readings can be interpreted very differently by a given body of
students. The spread of a given array of consumer products
does not necessarily mean the spread of a corresponding set of
values. If one goes to Canada, for example, one finds that the
“hardware” of everyday life, from coffee pots to cars, consists of
U.S. standard products. However, any visitor soon realizes that
the texture of social interactions—the “software” of daily life—
is quite different. This holds true for both Quebec and Anglo-
phone Canada.
Thus, global trends are always experienced in a given location
and fuse with local specificities. Global forces are filtered
through the “prism” of local conditions, to use Fred Riggs’s
metaphor (coined in the 1960s with reference to the possibility of
developing a universal science of development administration).
In other words, there is still some life in the old bumper sticker
“Think global, act local.” Rather than acting in a Canute-like
fashion, Eastern Europeans have independently learned to flow
with the tide and to adapt globally available products, technolo-
gies, and values to their own inherited culture. This is not a
problem-free process, nor is it one from which all — or even
most — people will benefit. But the process is less unidimen-
sional than globalization theory often suggests. Globalization is
a heterogeneous — not homogeneous — process. Within each
country, global trends are adapted to local conditions. Interna-
tionally, each country fits into the global economy and culture in
a different way.
V. The Transition in Eastern Europe
A. The Politics of Hesitant Democratization
1. Eastern Europe
How have these globalization trends played out concretely in
the countries of Eastern Europe since 1989? On the political
dimension, progress has been swift and positive. The revolu-
Peter Rutland
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tions of 1989 were remarkable for their speed and their general
lack of violence. Rarely has human history seen such a massive
transformation in political order take place with so little loss of
human life. This can be attributed mainly to Gorbachev’s deci-
sion not to allow the use of force to hold together the socialist
bloc in Eastern Europe. It can also be attributed to the ability of
most Eastern European communist elites to read the writing on
the wall and abandon the sinking ship of state socialism while
there was still time to find a place for themselves in the new
order. Some of the communist elites tried to gain a head start in
the new game of electoral politics by creating new reformed
socialist parties, and throughout the region, former nomenklatura
officials proved themselves skilled in adapting to the opportuni-
ties of the emerging market economy.
Of course, the impact of the transition was not peaceful in all
countries in transition. The southern arc of state socialism has
been torn apart by a series of bloody civil wars and international
conflicts: Yugoslavia, Abkhazia, Chechnya, Azerbaijan, and
Tajikistan. Together, these conflicts have claimed well over
100,000 lives and show little sign of abating.
Before discussing the extent of democratization, it is worth
spelling out what democracy means. The crucial features of
democracy are threefold. First, there must be selection of leaders
through competitive elections, i.e., elections where the chance
exists that the incumbent government might lose. Second, there
must be some degree of meaningful participation of the general
public in this selection process. For example, in the eighteenth
century, British governments were chosen through competitive
elections; but it was not a democracy, since the electorate was
less than 5 percent of the population. Third, there must be some
institutional structure protecting individual and minority rights;
a democracy that was a tyranny of the majority would clearly be
undesirable.
The democratization that has taken place in Eastern Europe,
with the exception of much of the former Yugoslavia, has gener-
ally been smooth and surprisingly successful. Looking at the
region from the vantage point of 1995, it is easy to take the pres-
ence of democracies in Eastern Europe for granted, but one
should remember the situation before 1989 and recall how diffi-
cult it was to imagine that democracy would become the normal
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form of political system in the region. It is instructive to recall
that a similar wave of enthusiasm greeted the first wave of
democratization at the end of the First World War, but those
democracies collapsed within a decade, save for Czechoslova-
kia, which survived until 1938.
In evaluating progress toward democracy, it is worth consid-
ering separately Eastern Europe (including the Baltic states) and
the eleven other states that arose on the basis of the former
Soviet Union. Beginning with East Europe, we find that the
political transition has not been entirely problem-free.19 There
are both strengths and weaknesses in their progress toward
democracy. Among the positive features is, first, the fact that the
countries of the region have regained their national sovereignty,
and, in some cases, they have established it for the first time. It is
important to recall that domination by an outside power has
been the main political problem for these countries through
most of their history. Second, governments are selected as a
result of free and fair elections, and some governments have
been voted out of office. A common pattern in earlier waves of
democratization (in postcolonial Africa, for example) was for
there to be one free election in the wake of independence, after
which the ruling party never allowed itself to lose an election.
Third, the media are generally free of government control,
although broadcast television remains in state hands. There is
still one private broadcast television station in the region, in the
Czech Republic; satellite television is rapidly penetrating the
region, however. Unfortunately, the media are short of funds
and have mostly sunken into crass commercialism. Critical and
investigative journalism is weakly present and in need of fur-
ther encouragement.
The rule of law is also an important component of democrati-
zation, and progress here has been modest. The court system is
relatively independent from political influence and has played a
limited role in exposing scandals and in judicial review of the
constitutionality of the legislature’s activities. However, the effi-
cient operation of the courts is hampered by inadequate fund-
ing, bureaucratic delays, a shortage of judges, and the need to
rewrite much of the legal code. Human rights are generally
respected, although there are some tensions over the treatment
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of Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, Russians in the Baltic,
and Gypsies throughout the region.
Apart from the presence of democratic institutions, it is also
important to note the relative absence of threats to democracy.
One of the most positive features of development since 1989,
and one that is rarely discussed, is that the military plays a very
marginal role in political life. This is important because a mili-
tary coup is by far the greatest single threat to democratic stabil-
ity, as is shown by the experiences of Latin American countries
and by the Eastern Europeans themselves during the interwar
period.
Similarly, the radical nationalist threat has failed to material-
ize. It is true that each country has acquired a lunatic fringe of
extreme nationalist parties, garnering from 3 to 8 percent of the
vote. However, such parties also exist in Western Europe, and
what is significant is that no mainstream political leaders have
chosen to follow the example of Slobodan Milosvevic in Serbia,
who used virulent nationalism to build a populist movement.
Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar is often accused of play-
ing this game. Although he is a highly effective demagogue and
the most popular individual leader in Eastern Europe among his
own electorate, he has stopped short of provoking violence.
Despite these achievements, the newly established Eastern
European democracies include some features that are less posi-
tive. The division of power between parliament and the presi-
dent is poorly defined, leading to frequent constitutional crises
(in Poland and Slovakia, for example). Local governments
remain weakly developed, and local councils enjoy little power.
A pervasive budgetary crisis means that governments are
unable to perform some of the most basic tasks required of
them, such as the provision of health care, education, and a
social safety net.
One of the major surprises of Eastern European democratiza-
tion has been the speed with which the euphoria of 1989 evapo-
rated. Despite launching one of the most dramatic popular
revolutions of modern history, the peoples of Eastern Europe
quickly became disillusioned with the institutions of democratic
rule. Each country in the region has seen increasing levels of
voter abstension combined with low and declining levels of
public confidence in all political institutions and leaders.20 From
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50 to 70 percent of the public express dissatisfaction with the
democratic process in their country. The first wave of pro-
reform coalition governments soon disintegrated, and in each
country they proved unable to win a repeat election. Reformed
ex-communist parties with a social democratic agenda emerged
victorious in the second wave of free elections in nearly all the
countries of the region. (The Czech Republic is an exception.)
Ex-communist and peasant parties aside, the identification of
voters with political parties is weak, and the political spectrum
is fragmented into a multiplicity of contending parties. Rules
setting a 4 to 5 percent cutoff for parties to get into parliament
mean that from 10 to 25 percent of votes are “wasted” on parties
that do not win representation. Typically, six to ten parties are
represented in parliament, with no single party gaining more
than a quarter of the votes. Complex and bitter political strug-
gles revolve around the formation of coalition governments, fur-
ther disillusioning the electorate.
Thus, contrary to the predictions of civil society theorists, a
network of pluralist political institutions has been slow to take
root in Eastern European society, and there has been much more
continuity in the composition of political elites than was initially
expected. It turns out that institutions can be changed faster
than the social networks that determine the distribution of
power within them. In almost all of these countries, individuals
who constitute the political elite are drawn from the second or
third rank of the old communist-era political elite. (“Rank” can
be measured by age — thirty-something as opposed to sixty-
something — and by institutional affiliation — academic insti-
tutes rather than Central Committees.)
Given the weakness of the development of civil society since
1989, one begins to wonder why these societies have pursued
the path of democratization. It was hard to identify specifically
the social groups pushing for democracy once the initial revolu-
tionary enthusiasm had subsided. It seems plausible to suggest
that the main force driving political transmission has not been
political forces within the countries involved but the “interna-
tional demonstration effect.” Eastern Europeans were per-
suaded that if they wanted to “return to Europe” (a popular
slogan of Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus) and to aspire to
the living standards and freedoms of the advanced capitalist
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countries, they would also have to adopt democracy. This argu-
ment was persuasive not just for the peoples of Eastern Europe,
but also for the ex-communist political elites who were still run-
ning most of the countries in the region.
A further question mark over democratization is the resur-
gence of nationalism.21 As noted above, radical nationalists have
not managed to gain access to political power. However, in all
the multinational countries in Eastern Europe, free elections
involved parties across the ideological spectrum within each
ethnic group, but virtually no parties managed to draw votes
from more than one ethnic group. Moreover, the political transi-
tion involved the collapse of all three of the federal structures in
the former socialist bloc — Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the
USSR itself. Some will argue (with benefit of hindsight) that
these federations were artificial concoctions that did not deserve
to have a future. However, the loss of Czechoslovakia should
give pause for thought, since it had been the proudest creation
of international democracy in the post-World War I era. One
cannot avoid the conclusion that democratization may exacer-
bate ethnic polarization in multiethnic societies. Also, the eco-
nomic transition clearly amplified these fissiparous tendencies,
since it had a differential impact on the various ethnic subunits
of these federations. The richer and most Westerly-located
regions — Slovenia, the Czech lands, and the Baltics — led the
way in the breakup of the federations, since they saw the chance
to gain from more rapid integration with the West.
With the collapse of the old socialist federations, the states of
Central Europe are more ethnically homogeneous than at any
time in history. Nevertheless, there are still sizable ethnic
minorities rather uneasily awaiting their treatment at the hands
of more or less democratically elected ethnic majorities. The
largest minorities are22:
Russians: in Latvia (34%), Estonia (30%), 
and Ukraine (22%)
Serbs: in Bosnia (33%) and Croatia (12%)
Albanians: in Macedonia (20%) and Serbia (17%)
Croats: in Bosnia (17%)
Hungarians: in Romania (11%) and Slovakia (9%)
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2. The Former Soviet Union
While democracy has established a firm footing in Eastern
Europe, its hold is much more tenuous the farther east one trav-
els.23 The breakup of the Soviet Union was caused primarily by a
collapse in the old elite’s will to rule rather than being the prod-
uct of conscious action from below. Moreover, in most cases, the
independence of the various republics was the result of deci-
sions taken by their communist leaderships threatened by the
rise of Boris Yeltsin in Moscow rather than a response to nation-
alist pressures. Mass nationalist movements really emerged only
in the republics of the Baltic and Caucasus, and not in Ukraine,
Belarus, or Central Asia. This means that, in contrast with East-
ern Europe, democratization has been much weaker in the states
of the former Soviet Union, where there has been much more
continuity in the composition of the ruling political elite from
the pre-1991 era.
The countries differ widely in the extent to which they man-
aged to dismantle the old Leninist political system. In some
(such as Ukraine and Russia), one saw the emergence of freely
elected parliaments and presidents, and one has a sense that
democratization is moving forward, at least in the sense that
elections matter. In others, the political changes have been
largely cosmetic, and the old elite retained the power under new
labels (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan). However,
even in the first group of countries, the “new” political elite is
drawn from the old communist nomenklatura, although they
were forced to abandon the ideology and organizational struc-
ture of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. They have
found it difficult to create a new set of values and principles to
shape their political behavior and to establish new institutions
to fill the vacuum caused by the demise of the Communist
Party. Almost every country has created a powerful presidency
combined with a weak but truculent parliament. Even more so
than in Eastern Europe, the initial democratic opposition move-
ments that sprang up in the late Gorbachev era lost popularity,
were repressed, or merged into the political elite. In most coun-
tries, particularly the large ones, the central authorities have
experienced a sharp decline in their capacity to exert their
authority over the provinces (for example, when it comes to rais-
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ing taxes). One has correspondingly seen a growing assertive-
ness by provincial elites, although this is not necessarily con-
ducive to democratization.
In the former Soviet Union, even more than in Eastern
Europe, one sees widespread public apathy and a very low level
of social mobilization (as measured by strikes, protests, and
membership in political parties and social organizations). This is
surprising given the desperate economic situation in which
many people find themselves. For example, one-third of the
Russian population living below the state-calculated psycholog-
ical minimum poverty line. The one issue around which mobi-
lization takes place is ethnicity. There are some 160 or so ethnic
conflicts currently brewing in the territory of the former USSR,
with open violence in about 10 of them. Countries such as Tajik-
istan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan have at times slipped into anar-
chy on the scale of, say, Lebanon. This high level of actual or
incipient violence is one reason why the military plays a very
important role in politics in the former Soviet states. Civilian
controls over the army are weak, and in contrast to Eastern
Europe, the chances of a military coup are quite high, even in
Russia itself.
B. Economic Transition: The Rocky Road to the Market
The economic transition in East Europe was driven by two pow-
erful elements — one spontaneous and the other the product of
deliberate policy choices. On one hand, one saw the collapse of
the old system of central planning and, in particular, the disinte-
gration of the system of managed international trade within
COMECON (a trade agreement between several Central and
Eastern European countries). This triggered an abrupt fall in
GDP that exceeded in magnitude that of the Great Depression of
the 1930s. Second, this more or less spontaneous process of eco-
nomic disintegration coincided with a deliberate effort by most
of the region’s governments to dismantle the remaining levers
of central planning and introduce the institutions of a market
economy. In assessing the economic transition, it is important to
remember that the impact of economic collapse — what János
Kornai has termed the “transitional recession” — has in many
respects been just as important as deliberate policy choices.
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Popular reactions to the economic transition have been torn
between two poles: the lost past and the unrealized future. Peo-
ple are distressed at the upheavals that have resulted from the
collapse of the old economy but are still hopeful that the market
reform policies will succeed. Polls conducted by Richard Rose
and others have shown that even people whose living standard
has fallen dramatically since 1990 (which is most of the popula-
tion) still broadly support the process of market reform and nur-
ture the hope that in five years’ time they will see some positive
results. The social impact of economic transition has appeared in
a fall in real wages of 20 to 40 percent and a rise in unemploy-
ment from almost 0 to 10 or 15 percent (although it has stayed at
3 percent in the Czech Republic). These countries were among
the most egalitarian in the world prior to 1989, at least in terms
of social and economic indicators (as opposed to political
power). The transition to the market has brought about a sharp
increase in social inequality. The value of pensions has fallen
and new groups of poor have been created, while a new busi-
ness class has quickly emerged. It seems clear that the benefits of
transition will be sharply differentiated according to social
group. There will be clear winners and clear losers, each
amounting to 10 or 15 percent of the population, and a large
group in the middle.
Many social services (such as health care and education) have
deteriorated, and the general uncertainty about the future seems
to have increased social stress. Suicide rates are up and birth
rates are down. Many of these negative consequences have had
a disproportionate impact on women. Women are often the first
to be fired, and they suffer disproportionately from cutbacks in
social welfare (such as the provision of kindergartens). Most
countries have not seriously liberalized the housing market —
rents in state apartments are still tightly controlled — so home-
lessness does not yet seem to be an acute problem.
However, not all the consequences of market transition have
been negative. On the positive side, people enjoy more freedom
than before — freedom to travel, to change their place of resi-
dence, to change jobs, and to buy what they want. Although the
data show that average real wages have fallen in every country,
statistics also report rising sales of consumer durables such as
VCRs, washing machines, and cars, not to mention holidays in
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Tunisia. So, people’s incomes are going down but their wealth is
going up! This apparent paradox may be due to a surge in unre-
ported income from the informal economy (including money
transfers from abroad), the sale of assets, or a pooling of earn-
ings by family members. Consumption patterns have also
changed. Changes in price structure have caused a sharp decline
in the consumption of some items such as meat, while new
products have appeared and, apparently, have found a robust
market. They range from tropical fruit juices and disposable dia-
pers to “gutbuster” exercise machines advertised on television.
(Yes, direct marketing has discovered Eastern Europe.)
Overall, the changes seem to be more attractive to the
younger generation, who will be able to take advantage of
future opportunities, than to older people, who may find it too
late to acquire new skills and adapt to new circumstances. In
any event, people seem to be responding to the social challenges
of transition in an individualist manner. They are coping with
the transition primarily by adapting their behavior at the level of
the family rather than through collective action (in political par-
ties or labor unions, for example). As in many social formations,
the family seems to be the great social shock absorber. Fortu-
nately, the Eastern European family seems to have survived
socialism in fairly good shape, perhaps even better than its
Western European counterpart. (This seems to be true despite,
for example, the high levels of divorce.) Perhaps the only real
form of collective activity that has surged since 1989 has been
religious groups and some leisure-related associations.
C. The Stages of Economic Reform
A consensus rapidly emerged among Western economists that
the creation of market capitalism in Eastern Europe would
require the pursuit of liberalization, stabilization, and privatiza-
tion.24
Liberalization involved freeing economic activity from state
regulation, such as price controls, export licenses, and restric-
tions on creating private businesses. It has been introduced to
some degree in almost all the economies of the region. Most
prices have been freed (rent and utilities being the major excep-
tion), restrictions on private enterprise were lifted, and barriers
Macalester International Vol. 2
26
12/19/95  12:49 PM      1870rut2.qxd
to external trade were lowered. In all countries where it was
attempted, liberalization proved quite easy to implement and
triggered a boom in street-corner entrepreneurship and a visible
change in the economic life of the country. Poland led the way
by lifting price controls in January 1990 (the “big bang”). Liber-
alization was relatively easy to achieve because it meant doing
less of something — regulating the economy — and could be
done quickly, almost with the stroke of a pen. This left no time
for interest groups potentially harmed by liberalization to mobi-
lize. The “shock therapy” launched in Russia in January 1992
brought only partial liberalization, however, since industrial
lobbies managed to block the freeing of energy prices, and the
government continues to regulate oil and gas exports, which are
the backbone of her foreign trade. Ukraine and the Central
Asian countries saw only limited liberalization of domestic
prices and foreign trade.
Stabilization involves achieving balance in the monetary and
fiscal flows of the economy. This means bringing price inflation
down to manageable levels (preferably less than 20 percent per
year), holding currency at a stable exchange rate, and attaining a
government budget deficit of less than, say, 5 percent of the
GDP. Stabilization usually necessitates cuts in real wages and in
government spending. These are necessarily painful decisions,
but governments came to realize that failure to stabilize their
economies would, in any case, produce these negative economic
consequences at an even higher level. The slump in economic
activity made stabilization very difficult to achieve, since tax
revenues collapsed and governments were unable to avoid
printing money to cover their spending. Even though living
standards fell and cost-push inflation was minimized through
wage controls, most Eastern Europeans remain saddled with
inflation in the range of 20 to 50 percent. Only the Czechs and
Estonians have been able to hold their currencies constant
against the dollar and the German mark since January 1991 and
June 1992, respectively. The Estonians managed this by creating
an independent central bank (with a currency legally tied to the
deutsche mark); the Czechs, by electing a fiscally conservative
government.
There was less political resistance to stabilization than many
observers had expected. After all, IMF-sponsored stabilization
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programs in the 1980s had triggered a wave of riots, strikes, and
coups throughout the Third World. The reason for the low level
of overt resistance in Eastern Europe is that many of the poten-
tially powerful economic groups with an interest in continuing
government subsidies (i.e., the old industrial sector) were psy-
chologically disempowered by the collapse of communism and
practically disarmed by the collapse of the party-ministry struc-
tures through which they had been organized. In only a few
cases were vibrant and organized interest groups inherited from
the ancien régime. (The Polish and Hungarian trade unions are
obvious examples.) Surprisingly, peasant parties proved to be
highly effective in some countries in using the new legislatures
to lobby for farm subsidies. They were helped by the relative
homogeneity of the peasants as an interest group.
Privatization has proved more difficult to achieve than liber-
alization or stabilization.25 Unlike the first two policies, privati-
zation required positive action from the government: breaking
up companies, seeking new owners, transferring assets, and
closing nonviable operations. Privatization could not but
involve resource allocation decisions between rival social
groups, which has led to parliamentary deadlock (e.g., Slovenia
and Estonia) and to interference from the judicial branch (e.g.,
Hungary). Politicians could try to persuade the public that liber-
alization and stabilization were necessary for the good of society
as a whole in the sense that they would provide universally
accessible public goods, stable prices, the right to buy imports,
and a usable currency. Privatization, by its very nature, involves
the creation of a new, and presumably narrow, class of property
owners.
Thus, although all the countries in transition proclaimed their
commitment to privatization as a general goal, few of them have
actually been able to implement a mass privatization policy
transforming a significant section of their economic assets.
Almost all the countries freed up the rules governing small-scale
private enterprise and allowed some privatization of small units
in retailing and public services. But very few countries moved
with privatization of land (Armenia and East Germany are the
leaders here), and only a handful were able to carry through a
property reform of large-scale industry.
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Russia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and East Germany are
the only cases where a significant degree of industrial privatiza-
tion has occurred. Even Poland and Hungary, which had been
the first to adopt stabilization measures and to open their coun-
tries to foreign trade and investment, found their large-scale pri-
vatization programs mired in political and legal controversy.
The same was true of the Baltic countries and Slovenia, while
the remainder (Ukraine, Romania, etc.) were slow even to get to
the stage of proclaiming a program. The East German program
succeeded because the German government was prepared to
subsidize the costs of the program to the tune of $100 billion a
year. The Czech and Russian programs were successfully imple-
mented because of political concessions to broad social groups.
In each country, privatization vouchers were distributed to the
general population, who used them to bid for shares in enter-
prises. (The Russian scheme was structured differently and
favored worker buyouts.) Thus ordinary citizens felt that they
were benefiting from the program — although, in reality in both
countries, effective control over most assets was transferred into
the hands of managerial elites. Most of the other countries are
toying with voucher privatization schemes, which have become
bogged down in political controversy and administrative confu-
sion.
D. The Pros and Cons of Shock Therapy
Despite their confidence in their market prescription at the level
of economic theory, Western analysts remained open-minded
over the political feasibility of the transition to market. They
were divided over whether speedy implementation of the tran-
sition package was politically feasible and whether the costs of
doing so (in the form of an accelerated slump in output) would
exceed the benefits as perceived by voters and established inter-
est groups. There were two schools of thought on this issue. The
“window of opportunity” school, represented by the 1990 Polish
Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, argued that a reform gov-
ernment had to move as quickly as possible so as to preempt
political mobilization by the opponents of transition, i.e., the
farmers, workers, and bureaucrats with a vested interest in pre-
serving the old economic structures. The “consensus building”
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school, represented, implicitly, by President Boris Yeltsin of
Russia, took the line of building up a political coalition for
reform by making concessions to key groups with the capacity
to sabotage the reforms (most notably, the industrial managers).
In practice, it proved easy to carry out speedy liberalization but
very difficult to build the political coalitions required to make
stabilization and privatization succeed.
The advocates of rapid economic transition did not go unchal-
lenged. Skeptical economists of social democratic orientation
advanced several persuasive arguments that have often been
overlooked in the rush to the market. They first pointed out that
capitalism had taken centuries to develop in the West, and it
was unrealistic to expect market institutions to take root instan-
taneously—“Nescafé capitalism,” to paraphrase Carlos Fuentes.
Second, they argued that it was unfair to tell the Eastern Euro-
peans that they had no choice but to adopt Anglo-American-
style liberal capitalism, since there are many different variants of
capitalism in the contemporary world, e.g., state corporatism in
East Asia, bank-dominated firms in Germany, the Swedish
social market economy, etc. There was no justification in assum-
ing that the Eastern Europeans would not develop their own
unique synthesis of capitalist institutions with local cultural
specificities. Third, they pointed out that the collapse of the
COMECON trade system had plunged these economies into an
old-fashioned depression so massive that it would have killed
off even healthy firms in an established capitalist economy.
Until demand in these economies recovered, there was little
point in trying to pick winners or to expect to see viable firms
emerge from the wreckage of the command economies.
However, these dissenting voices were unable to come up
with a plausible alternative to “shock therapy,” and they were
not able to influence the policy advice emanating from the inter-
national financial institutions. However, the skeptics sat tight on
the left wing of the political spectrum within the various Eastern
European countries. Many of them rose to political power with
the second wave of elections in 1993–94 which brought social
democrats to power in many countries of the region (e.g.,
Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria). Ironically,
however, once in office, many of them felt obliged to adopt the
very stabilization policies that they had excoriated in opposi-
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tion. Polish Finance Minister Grzegorz Koloodko is an outstand-
ing example of this dilemma.
VI. Future Prospects
In summary, the countries in transition can be grouped into
three categories in terms of their rate of progress in economic
transition.
The first group consists of the countries that can see a light at
the end of the tunnel: the Baltics, Poland, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and, perhaps, Albania. These
countries all attempted to implement market reform policies
fairly rigorously, and after experiencing two or three years of
recession, they have begun to experience positive growth. Note
that all of these countries are located on the Western rim of the
former socialist bloc and are, thus, immediately adjacent to
Western markets. Expanding trade with the West, leading ulti-
mately to European Union membership, is a feasible goal for
most of these states.
The second group are those countries that have started down
the reform path but cannot yet see the end of the tunnel. Roma-
nia, Bulgaria, and parts of Russia would be examples. They have
taken some steps to liberalize their economies although inflation
remains high; they face a heavy burden of foreign debt; and
their GDP continues to fall. One can imagine that if they hang on
for a few more years, their economies might turn the corner.
The final group are those countries that are still in the tunnel
and can hear a train coming at them. Reform efforts have stalled,
and daily life has become a grim struggle for survival. Much of
the vast territory of Russia falls into this category, as does
Ukraine and most of Central Asia. Even in these countries, there
are some signs of progress, such as a rise in private entrepre-
neurship and increased trade with the West, but it is hard to
imagine these small positive steps lifting up the entire economy.
VII. Conclusion
What lessons can Western observers draw from this complex
and multifaceted experience? I would suggest three: unpre-
dictability, interdependence, and heterogeneity. All three are
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connected — it is the interdependence of heterogeneous nations
that produces the unpredictability.
One trite conclusion is to expect the unexpected. Nobody pre-
dicted the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe or the
vicious bloodshed in Yugoslavia. One cannot but conclude that
similar unpredictable happenings might be just around the cor-
ner. The collapse of socialism is a sobering reminder that human
history is dynamic and spontaneous, and it refuses to conform
to the expectations of prevailing social thought.
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the dramatic changes
that have been unleashed since 1989. No one expected radical
market reform to spread as quickly as it did. Political scientists
argued that there was no social constituency in Eastern Europe
in favor of building capitalism, while there were many social
groups already in place who would stand to lose from market
reform (and lose they did). And yet, market reform was more or
less introduced throughout the entire region, from Albania to
Mongolia. This implies that developments at the level of the
international system are more powerful than the particular
coalition of forces within a particular country. It should also
serve to remind us of the power of ideas, since it was the ideas of
the market and of democracy that have been driving the transi-
tion more than concrete and tangible international forces such as
military occupation or direct foreign investment.
Despite the presence of uniform trends, however, one should
note that the various countries have preserved and even
strengthened their separate identities in the process of market
transition. Integration does not necessarily mean homogeniza-
tion. Each country has adopted different combinations of the
economic policy mix being offered. Where they have arrived at a
similar result (such as stable inflation), it has usually been
through the adoption of different policies and divergent politi-
cal arrangements in comparison with their colleagues in transi-
tion. Even the international financial institutions have
acknowledged that heterodoxy, rather than orthodoxy, is the
order of the day in the selection of policy instruments.
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